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ABSTRACT 
 
Reverse Auction Bidding – Multiple Group Study.  
(August 2012) 
Xun Zhou, B. Eng., Chongqing University 
Co-Chairs of Committee, John M. Nichols 
                                            Nancy L. Holland 
 
 
Reverse Auction Bidding is a recently developed auction method. In this form of 
bidding process, the roles of the bidders and the owner are interchanged in terms of the 
form of the economic transaction. The owner’s objective is to drive the unit rates down 
and the bidder’s objective is to maintain an acceptable profit level. A study into Reverse 
Auction Bidding commenced at Texas A&M University in 2004 and continues to this 
time, with this the eighteenth study in the series. This study is the second multi-group 
study in the research. In this study, a multiple group comparison was made between 
different numbers of bidders, with Games One, Two and Three having three, four and 
ten bidders respectively. All participants were faculty and students from the Department 
of Construction Science. The critical requirement for the participants is that they should 
have no prior experience using the Reverse Auction Bidding system. The eighteen 
studies have concentrated on new players, with future studies planned for repeat 
participants. A number of the recent case studies have shown personality has an impact 
on the performance of the bidders. However, this work was not controlled for 
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personality, as the research objective was to determine the impact of a different number 
of bidders in a game. The Keirsey Temperament Sorter test was completed by all 
participants, so that the results could be understand in terms of personality impact on the 
level of return to each participant. The results showed the number of bidders has a 
significant impact on the individual returns confirming the earlier work on varying the 
number of bidders. An increase in the number of bidders was shown to lead to a more 
competitive economic environment, which given usual economic circumstances lead to a 
reduction in the number of firms interested in bidding, for the self-evident economic 
reasons. This work points to the need to investigate a bidding group size of five or six, 
which is likely to be the self-constrained upper limit in a real economic system.  Some 
interesting observations on the personality types suggest that further work is required in 
this area. 
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CHAPTER I  
INTRODUCTION 
 
 Background to the Study 
Reverse Auction Bidding, henceforth RAB, is a reasonably new purchase method 
used in a procurement process. The method has been adopted by a number of owners 
and government agencies, with the implicit aim of increasing competition between 
bidders, hence forcing the lowest possible bid for a service (van Vleet, 2004). The ethics 
of this system are not considered further in this study (Gregory, 2006). The traditional 
bidding method is called the sealed bids, which is held at a specified time and a specified 
place (Little, Fowler, Coulson, Onions, & Friedrichsen, 1973). The OED (Little et al., 
1973) defines a bid as ‘the offer of a price’. As Guhya (2010) noted in his statistical 
study of the first work by van Vleet (2004): 
 
The traditional form of obtaining a bid is to request a price from one or more 
entities, such as a builder, contractor or company, with the bid due at a 
specific time and place. This system of bidding is considered by most to be free 
of collusive influences. Alternative forms of bidding have been developed over 
the centuries; some suffer from the need for a subjective judgment about the 
ability of the bidder to perform the work, although prequalification may [help] 
____________ 
This thesis follows the style of Adult Education Quarterly. 
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Within a free market, a competent bidder should be aware of the average 
expenditure required to gain a sale; as an example noted by Guhya (2010) in consulting 
engineering the amount of eight percent of the fee is generally considered reasonable for 
recovering the costs of preparing bids (Nichols, 2009). In bid shopping, as by Guhya 
(2010) noted, the second entity does not have to cover the cost of preparing multiple bids 
to obtain work, which is clearly and often perceived as economically unfair and distorts 
the market in an unfair manner. The essence of competition is fairness (Hartford, 2005). 
Reverse Auction Bid Systems were developed specifically for the internet as the 
perceived distance between bidder and purchaser is decreasing allowing people to 
facilitate purchase of goods away from the local entities. In this system, the concept of 
the ‘traditional market’ has been broken down, often when the purchaser and seller 
cannot meet in the same place or it is difficult to meet in a common place. As Guhya 
(2010) further noted, Reverse Auction Bidding systems are considered by some people 
as being an alternative form of bid shopping. Nichols (2009) considers Reverse Auction 
Bidding Systems, when operated by an independent entity of the purchaser, represents 
an electronic equivalent of a free market. Further work on this type of statistical study of 
online auctions is now commonplace in the literature (Puro, Teich, Wallenius, & 
Wallenius, 2011). 
A Reverse Auction Bidding System is a multiplayer game, with two sub-games. 
Guhya documents the theory put forward by Nichols that (Guhya, 2010; Nichols, 2010) 
the first sub-game, designated α  game, is between the bidders and the second is the 
game between the bidding group and the purchaser, designated the ω  game.  
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The α  game is classified as a multi-player game; however the ω  game reduces 
in reality to a two-player game, with only one effective player able to make moves. The 
reduction of the ω  game to an equivalent two player game can be viewed as maximizing 
the return to the bidding group, designated λ  player, at the expense of the purchaser, 
designated υ  player. This game theory was developed based on the results of four player 
games; this study looks at a ten player game to determine if the game concepts can be 
maintained in the analysis.  
Several case studies have been completed for a simple Reverse Auction Bidding 
scenario developed by van Vleet (2004). The purpose of this research is to complete a 
second trial of multiplayer games with other than four players as occurred in the third 
study by Gregory (2006). 
 
 Research Objectives 
 The research objectives are: 
1. Complete RAB games using three, four and ten participants. 
2. Compare the results between these games and to the previously collected 
results. 
3. Compete a statistical study of the results using the methods developed by 
Guhya (2010) for the analysis of the first case study by van Vleet (2004). 
4. Determine if evidence of the ω  game exists and does it represent some 
form of tacit collusion. 
  
4 
 
 
 Hypothesis 
The hypothesis to be tested to provide the results required to meet the research 
objectives are: 
1. As the number of bidders increase, the average profits for the bidder will 
decrease. 
2. As the number of bidders increase, the average price for each job will 
decrease. 
3. The key findings from earlier research on: 
a.  the use of bank loans;  
b. bidding patterns with time; 
c. personality type performance; 
d. observed statistic results on participant’s returns will be observed in 
the results. 
 
 Limitations and Delimitations 
The participants of this study are limited to the students or faculty in the 
Department of Construction Science. No industry professionals are used in this study. 
The participants will be randomly selected from the Department of Construction Science; 
none of them has any experience on RAB before.  
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The types of personality won’t be controlled for in the study participant selection 
as has occurred in a number of the studies. Economic and all the other conditions that 
may have an adverse effect on the bidding process are assumed steady throughout the 
period of this study game. 
 
Significance of the Study 
This research will help the further understanding of Reverse Auction Bidding, 
continuing a long running study at TAMU. 
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CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 Introduction 
This thesis documents the twentieth study on Reverse Auction Bidding at TAMU 
undertaken in the Construction Science Department. This literature review looks at the 
prior work and the research by others into online auction systems to establish the key 
elements of interest to understanding the work.  
 
 Definitions 
This research is a continuation of previous Reverse Auction Bidding studies. 
Previous definitions established by others (Gregory, 2006; Guhya, 2010; van Vleet, 
2004) are included in this list from necessity. The definitions are now considered to have 
entered the lexicon of Reverse Auction Bidding studies at TAMU and are repeated 
verbatim here as not all studies are readily available outside of TAMU. The necessary 
definitions are: 
λ   player: This represents the bidder group, treated as a single entity 
for the purpose of game analysis. 
iλ  player: The i
th bidder in the bidding group. 
υ  player: This represents the purchaser. 
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α  game: The postulated sub-game played between bidders in 
seeking economic advantage over the remaining bidders. 
This game almost always disadvantages the υ  player, but 
the υ  player created the system and so is responsible for 
the υ  player’s economic losses as a result. 
ω  game: The postulated sub-game played within the Reverse 
Auction Bidding game between the purchaser and the 
bidders. In terms of this analysis, it is deemed to 
effectively reduce to a two-player game, with competition 
implications for all players. The υ  player in reality sees 
only the average of all won bids.  
τ : Bid time allowed for each round of play in the game. 
δ : Period between bid time τ  that represents the work time 
in the game. 
jB : i
th bid 
vB : Accepted bid for each job. 
Κ : This variable is a fixed dollar sum, representing the υ   
player’s base price, although in this game K is a vector of 
costs.  
Γ : This variable is a fixed dollar sum, representing the υ   
player’s maximum incremental price above Κ . 
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Ξ : This variable is normally defined by the set of numbers 
{ | 0 1}Ξ < Ξ ≤ , although negative values of Ξ are 
permitted by the Reverse Auction Bidding system. Ξ  is 
used to normalize the profit data. A negative jΞ  
represents a loss on direct costs to the iλ player who makes 
this type of bid, and enough of these bids will lead to a 
bankrupt player. This type of play is discouraged as the 
assumption in the game is steady state economic 
conditions in the outside economy. Future studies may 
look at a failing market, but that is beyond this study.  
Aggressive Bidder:  Willing to accept calculated risk of greater than average 
loss in pursuit of greater than average returns, first defined 
by Chouhan (2009).  
Bid: A single entry into the game that represents a legally 
acceptable offer to complete the work assuming the bidder 
has been prequalified.  
Bidder:  An entity that submits a bid. In this game, there are usually 
three to ten bidders, and each is an individual, rather than a 
company. In van Vleet’s (2004) study, none of the bidders 
had prior experience, which is not true for Chouhan’s 
(2009) study.  
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Bid Efficiency: It is the ratio of the total number of jobs won to the total 
number of bids. This is one of the postulated metrics for 
determining success in the α  game.  
Case Study:  ‘Designed to study intensely one set (or unit) of 
something; for e.g. programs, cities, counties, worksites-as 
a distinct whole, with the goal of understanding the set as a 
distinct whole in its particular context. A case study 
reveals the process and outcome at certain sites and the 
way in which these interrelate. Case studies are conducted 
primarily using qualitative techniques, but do not exclude 
quantitative data.’ (van Vleet, 2004) 
Collusion:  ‘A secret agreement between two or more parties for a 
fraudulent, illegal or deceitful purpose (van Vleet, 2004).’ 
Or as defined by the OED as ‘secret agreement or 
understanding for the purpose of trickery or fraud,’ is 
generally considered to be reprehensible and is usually 
illegal in a free market system, because of the economic 
distortions introduced into the market.  
Dutch Auction: ‘It is a type of auction where the auctioneer begins with a 
high asking price which is lowered until some participant 
is willing to accept the auctioneer's price, or a 
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predetermined reserve price (the seller's minimum 
acceptable price) is reached.’ (van Vleet, 2004).  
Economic Winner:  ‘An individual who generated the highest average returns.’ 
Panchal (2007) coined this term to indicate a more 
successful player in the α  game. An economic winner 
makes no direct difference to the ω  game for the υ   
player where the υ   player has an objective of minimizing 
the average bid for the game. The υ  player sees the 
average price for purchases and a distribution of prices.  
Economic Loser:  ‘An individual who generated the lowest average returns.’ 
Panchal (2007) coined this term to indicate a less 
successful player in the α  game. An economic loser 
makes no direct difference to the ω  game for the υ   
player where the υ   player has an objective of minimizing 
the average bid for the game.  
Efficiency: The ration of the output to the input of any system.  
Game: a series of jobs for the construction of a reinforced 
concrete floor slab, each game lasts approximately 8 to 10 
weeks in game play time, with each round of the game 
modelling a week and occurring in a 20 minute period, 
with 15 minutes of bid time and 5 minutes of build time.  
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Game theory:  A formal analysis of conflict and cooperation among 
intelligent and rational decision makers.  
Herfindahl Index: ‘a measure of the size of firms in relationship to the 
industry and an indicator of the amount of competition 
among them. It is defined as the sum of the squares of the 
market shares of each individual firm. As such, it can 
range from 0 to 10,000, moving from a very large amount 
of very small firms to a single monopolistic producer. 
Decreases in the Herfindahl index generally indicate a loss 
of pricing power and an increase in competition, whereas 
increases imply the opposite. The Department of Justice 
considers Herfindahl indices between 1000 and 1800 to be 
moderately concentrated and indices above 1800 to be 
concentrated. As the market concentration increases, 
competition and efficiency decrease and the chances of 
collusion and monopoly increase.’ (van Vleet, 2004).  
Job: A work unit, in this case a reinforced concrete slab for a 
home builder, taking 5 working days to construct.  
Loan amount:  It is a bank loan or a guarantee taken by the bidder with 
the purpose of increasing the bidders’ job capacity. The 
cost is $500 per job.  
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Loss: negative return applied to a business undertaking after all 
operating expenses have been met.  
Lump Sum offer: A tender submitted for a lump sum amount in the game 
assumed to be for a fixed price.  
Pre-Qualified: The process of declaring competent or capable or to certify 
in advance. The purpose of pre – qualified is to maintain 
the economic competition.  
Profit: The return received on a business undertaking after all 
operating expenses have been met.  
Profit Efficiency:  It is the ratio of the profit made to the number of jobs won. 
This is one of the postulated metrics for determining 
success in the α  game.  
Purchaser: Either an owner or owner’s representative who organizes 
the bid or tender document.  
RAB:                       It is a single or multiple-item, open, descending-price 
auction. The initiator specifies the opening bid price and 
bid decrement. Each bidder submits a successively lower 
bid. At the end of the auction, the bidder with lowest bid 
value is being considered as a winner (van Vleet, 2004).  
Second Bidder Issue:        ‘It has been postulated that the lowest bidder in Reverse 
Auction Bidding is seeking to undercut the second bidder 
by the smallest quantifiable fragment, if the bidder 
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understands the principles of tacit collusion.’ (Chaudhari, 
2009). The hypothesis forms the basis for future research.  
Sealed Bidding:  ‘In this type of auction, all bidders simultaneously submit 
bids in such a way that no bidder knows the bid of any 
other participant. The highest/lowest bidder is awarded the 
contract at an agreed price, all other things being equal.’ 
(van Vleet, 2004).  
Sherman Antitrust Act:       ‘The act, based on the constitutional power of Congress to 
regulate interstate commerce, declared illegal every 
contract, combination (in the form of trust or otherwise), 
or conspiracy in restraint of interstate and foreign trade.’ 
According to Nichols (2010), the problem is tacit collusion 
does not fit within the meanings of the act, thus leading to 
the debate about the legality of RAB between contractors 
who consider it illegal or unethical and economists who 
accept the converse.  
Tacit Collusion: ‘Seemingly independent, but parallel actions among 
competing firms (mostly oligopolistic firms) in an industry 
that achieve higher prices and profits, much as if guided by 
an explicit collusion agreement. Also termed implicit 
collusion, the distinguishing feature of tacit collusion is the 
lack of any explicit agreement. The key is that each firm 
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seems to be acting independently, perhaps each responding 
to the same market conditions, but the end result is the 
same as an explicit agreement. This should be contrasted 
with explicit or overt collusion that does involve a formal, 
explicit agreement. Tacit collusion is observed in Reverse 
Auction Bidding, and is potentially related to the Second 
Bidder Issue.’ (Chouhan, 2009). Nichols (2010) postulates 
that the α game has been observed and misunderstood as 
tacit collusion, in reality it can be viewed potentially 
reviewed as an aggressive player seeking a better than 
average return from the profit distribution resulting from 
the α game.  
Traditional bidding:  ‘In this type of auction all bidders simultaneously submit 
bids in such a way that no bidder knows the bid of any 
other participant. The highest/lowest bidder is assumed to 
be awarded at the price submitted provided no other 
contracts opened on the decision process.’ (Chaudhari, 
2009) 
Winners Curse: Problem faced by uninformed bidders or poor game 
players. For example, in an initial public offering 
uninformed participants are likely to purchase larger 
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allotments of issues that informed participants know are 
overpriced.  
 
 Background to the Reverse Auction Game Theory 
Guhya (2010) documented the game concepts for Reverse Auction bidding 
suggested by Nichols (2010). The key element is a Reverse Auction Bidding game 
where the υ  player is willing to accept bids of the type shown in equation (1): 
 j jΒ = Κ +Ξ Γ ,       (1) 
This development has been shown to provide a stable statistical pattern to the 
bidding data for four and five player games as shown in   Table 1 for van Vleet’s data 
(Guhya, 2010). 
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  Table 1   
  Normalized Profit Results 
Ξ  Range Number 
Less than 0 0 
0 to 0.1 3 
0.11 to 0.2 35 
0.21 to 0.3 13 
0.31 to 0.4 4 
0.41 to 0.5 5 
0.51 to 0.6 2 
0.61 to 0.7 7 
0.71 to 0.8 2 
0.81 to 0.9 1 
0.91 to 1.0 1 
 
 
This first set of normalized results were plotted for van Vleet’s results in Figure 1 
by Guhya (2010) and are replicated here because of the importance of understanding the 
strategy used by some bidders. 
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Figure 1. Histogram of the Ξ; Results Shown in Table 1 
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Interestingly this result was not found until the eighth study given that is appears 
to be evident from the earliest result set. The real analysis problem is not the data, but 
the size and complexity of the data source and the need to work across a number of 
studies. This work provides an interesting problem in data mining. The problem was to 
some extent exacerbated by the change from the original Microsoft Access database and 
ASP system (Kim, 2004) to the SQL Server system developed by Wellington (2006) as a 
result of the difficulty of managing a ten player game using Access during the study by 
(Gregory, 2006). Microsoft Access was designed as a single user database system.  
Γ  represents the upper limit the υ  player is prepared to pay in the game above 
the nominal minimum bid amount Κ . A negative jΞ  represents a loss on direct costs to 
the iλ player who makes this type of bid, and enough of these bids will lead to a bankrupt 
player. The concept of Γ can be attributed to Feigenbaum (Nichols, 2010), who 
considered there had to be an upper limit everyone was prepared to pay for a service or 
good, although this is a generally accepted economic theory (Perloff, 2004), the reality is 
established by negotiation rather than by fiat. 
Feigenbaum’s concept of a maximum price point is akin to the economic concept 
of the subcontractor taking all of the profit from the transaction, which clearly puts the 
purchaser at economic risk (Perloff, 2004). This price point issue was studied as part of a 
RAB case study using the price of Coca Cola ™ as the base product (Gujarathi, 2007). 
The small study showed a price range from 1 unit to about 3.5 units of cost for the range 
of available transactions. As Hartford (2005) notes the price can be driven by scarcity or 
monopoly rent type issues to give two examples. There has been significant discussion 
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amongst the research team undertaking and directing this study as to the range of prices 
that would be charged by the bidders for the work. At this stage there is no real 
resolution to this issue aside from the following comments that seem applicable: 
1. The purchaser is silent in the transactions except for two occasions, in one study 
the purchaser interfered by having one of the bidders drive down the prices to 
rock bottom, causing serious discussion in the bid group. 
2. In this current study one of the bidders was bidding recklessly and was 
considered a high bankruptcy threat imperilling the purchaser’s business model 
of rapid turnover and high quality. The bidder was removed.  
As Guhya (2010) noted the bidding period for each game lasts for a set time, τ , 
in this case it is 15 minutes. The total cost for υ   player is shown in equation (2): 
1
n
v j
j=
Β = Β∑ ,        (2) 
This total cost is based on the accepted lower bid for each job, where the λ  
player submitted a valid bid. Each iλ  player then has a unique set of bids and a unique 
set of jobs, with a total return to the iλ  player defined by a simple summation. 
The interesting issue is that Reverse Auction Bidding exposes the bidding 
strategy for the bidders to the purchaser, giving both sides an incredible amount of high 
quality economic data on the current state of the game market, provided there are no 
outside influences, and aside from the two mentioned earlier there have been none. It is 
instructive to consider the games that have been completed to this time, refer Table 2. 
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Table 2  
Previous RAB Studies at TAMU 
Study 
Number 
Name Date Number 
Participants 
Comments 
1 Van Vleet July 2004 Five First Study to establish 
system, no controls on price 
2 Shankar July 2005 Five Duplicated Van Vleet’s study 
3 Gregory December 
2006 
Three, Six, 
Ten 
Multigame study 
4 Gujarathi November 
2007 
Four Coke Study included and first 
four player game 
5 Panchal November 
2007 
Four Standard Study 
6 Chouhan August 
2009 
Four Bidder’s personality studied 
7 Chaudhari December 
2009 
Four Owners Interference 
8 Machado November 
2009 
Four Personality Study 
9 Petersen May 2010 Four Poor economic performer 
types studied 
10 Guhya May 2010 Five Statistical Analysis of First 
Case Study 
11 Saigonkar May 2010 Four Personality 
12 Billing August 
2010 
- Graph Theory Study 
13 Gupta August 
2010 
Four Study Guardians 
14 Patel August 
2010 
Four Study personality 
15 Somani August 
2010 
Four Study Guardians 
16 Plumber August 
2010 
Four Personality Type 
17 Bhalerao August 
2011 
Four Statistical Study of the Fourth 
Case Study data 
18 This 
study 
August 
2012 
Three, four 
and ten 
Repeat Study 3 
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The key stages represented in the research in are: 
1. development of the web site and understanding the bidding strategies of the bidders 
was up to and including Study Three (Gregory, 2006; Shankar, 2005; van Vleet, 
2004); 
2. Study Four, (Gujarathi, 2007), looked at fixing an upper limit to the price as 
suggested by Feigenbaum (Dagostino & Feigenbaum, 2003; Nichols, 2010), using 
Coca Cola™ sales price as a guide, which is line with accepted microeconomic 
theory (Perloff, 2004); 
3. Study Five as a four bidder study (Panchal, 2007) continued the development of 
the process; 
4. Study Six, (Chouhan, 2009), was the first work to look at the impact of personality 
using the Keirsey Temperament Sorter Test; 
5. Study Seven, (Chaudhari, 2009), showed that owners interference in the process 
caused disruption in the results and significant disquiet in the bidders. The old 
adage, if looks like a duck and smells like a duck then it is a duck applies to this 
scenario as the bidders quickly perceived the interference; 
6. Study Set Eight, Nine, Eleven and Thirteen to Sixteen, (Gupta, 2010; Machado, 
2009; Patel, 2010; Petersen, 2011; Plumber, 2010; Saigaonkar, 2010; Somani, 
2010); 
7. Study Ten, (Guhya, 2010), was a through statistical analysis of the first case study. 
The work established a number of the standard techniques now used in the analysis 
of the RAB results; 
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8. Study Twelve, (Billing, 2010), looked at the use of graph theory to understand the 
bidding process (Behzad & Chartrand, 1998); 
9. Study Seventeen, (Bhalerao, 2011), completed a study similar to Guhya (2010) to 
confirm this earlier work; 
10. Study Eighteen, this study is designed to replicate the work by Gregory (2006). 
 
Historical Use 
Reverse Auction bidding, as a new variant of Dutch auction, has become a 
widely used tool in the construction industry. Some purchasers are starting to use this 
biding system as a common purchasing method. Usually a purchaser or surrogate 
company will create a website that can handle RAB jobs, such as that developed by W. 
Kim (2004) for van Vleet (2004). The information to bid on a job is either posted on the 
website or sent to prequalified bidders.  
All qualified bidders must bid through this website, and each bidder can see the 
current lowest price. A bidder can lower their bid according to the current lowest bid 
within a specified timing system, since the lowest price can wins the bid in the end.  
Some assert that reverse auctions bidding largely reduces the cost and the cycle 
time for the purchasers. For example, General Electric Inc., one of the largest electronic 
companies in the world, has stated a reduction of 520% in procurement cost due to this 
method (Presutti Jr, 2003). This type of statement cannot of course be proven (Hartford, 
2005) as the reduction would have occurred most likely in a hard bid environment.  
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Recent research results collected from thirty individual companies, by 
Schoenherr and Mabert (2007), have suggested to some that myths about the reverse 
auction process may be false, as follows: 
1. Lowering the price of the bid is not the most important objective in the reverse 
auctions; 
2. Either commodity item or non-commodity items can be bid in the reverse auctions; 
3. Reverse auctions may harm the buyer – supplier relationship, but a lot of methods 
can be used to prevent this happening; 
4. Though the first time bidding may generate higher profits, it doesn’t mean profits 
will disappear in the following bidding process;  
5. Even though there is a decline in the usage of reverse auction, for the long run, it 
is still a very promising method. 
According to Beall, Carter, Carter, Gerne, Hendrick, Jap. (2003) it is:  
” an online, real-time dynamic auction between a buying organization and a group of 
pre-qualified suppliers who compete against each other to win the business to supply 
goods or services […]. These suppliers compete by bidding against each other online 
over the Internet using specialized software by submitting successively lower bids 
during a scheduled time period. This time period is usually only about an hour, but 
multiple, brief extensions are usually allowed if bidders are still active at the end of 
the initial time period”  
The graph shown in Figure 2 can better explain the main common myths about 
reverse auction now. 
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Figure 2. Common Myths Associated with Online Reverse Auctions after 
Schoenherr and Mabert (2007) 
 
Kaufmann and Carter (2004) provided a very specific and detailed literature 
review in their paper on RAB systems. As with all new systems it will take a while for 
the economic studies to catch up with the practical reality. The perception is that costs 
are reduced, the reality according to the TAMU work is that this is not always true 
(Guhya, 2010). 
Although there are a number of people holding negative opinions against Reverse 
Auction Bidding systems, the positive aspects of Reverse Auction Bidding systems 
cannot be neglected (Caniëls & van Raaij, 2009). The biggest factor shown in recent 
result is: 
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1. that suppliers from developing economies tend to accept Reverse Auction Bidding 
systems more than those from mature economies.  
2. Also, “firms that aim to compete on prices are very positive on [Reverse Auction 
Bidding systems].” 
3. different individuals may have different opinions on Reverse Auction Bidding 
systems,  
a. sales people and tenured managers are opposed to this kind of method;  
b. Sales people live on revenue and margin; 
c. managers are rewarded on market share.  
4. Reverse Auction Bidding systems may reduce the connection between the buyers 
and suppliers to some extent (Caniëls & van Raaij, 2009).  
Ray, Jenamani, and Mohapatra (2011) have proposed “a novel multiple attribute 
relationship-preserving reverse auction mechanism for a limited supplier base”, which 
can help create a healthy competition environment. Wagner and Schwab (2004) in 
considering the issues that have impact on the Reverse Auction Bidding systems, divided 
them into three categories:  
1. Core problems of the auction, for example, the goods or services that is going to be 
auctioned, suppliers etc;  
2. Characteristics of the auction process, like the auction type, rules, period, etc; 
3. preparation and conduction of the auction. 
To better understand the purchaser’s motivation for using reverse auctions, some 
research has been completed as follows: 
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1. Amelinckx, Muylle, and Lievens (2008) created a model to show the sourcing 
outcome of buying firms and the e-sourcing success.  
2. Smeltzer and Carr (2003) interviewed a bunch of purchasing companies and got 
“three primary motivations, three perceived risks and four conditions for success.”  
3. Smeltzer and Carr (2003) further concluded that the conditions for successfully 
using Reverse Auction Bidding systems are:  
a. clear and comprehensive specifications of the commodity must be provided;  
b. an attractive bid must be based on a large enough purchase to encourage 
suppliers to bid;  
c.  “the appropriate supply market must exist”;  
d. “the appropriate infrastructure must exist within the buying organization.”  
Importantly, the reasons for using reverse auction by buyers, according to their 
research, are “new business, market penetration, cycle time reduction and inventory 
management”. Even though only two parties may well be involved in the final stages of 
bidding, at least four or five viable, competitive bidders are generally required to begin 
an auction” (Smeltzer & Carr, 2003). 
These reasons for using RAB makes sense, any reasoning based on price 
minimization clearly fails to understand the auction process or human nature.  
 
 Personality Testing 
All the participants were asked to take a test called Keirsey Temperament Sorter 
(KTS) Test before they start bidding. This test is used to evaluate the personalities of 
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those bidders who have participated in the RAB game. The sixteen personality types 
defined by Keirsey are shown in Table 3. 
 
Table 3  
KTS Different Personality Types 
 Temperament Role Role Variant 
Introspective 
(N) 
Idealist (NF) 
Diplomatic 
Mentor (NFJ) 
Developing 
Teacher (ENFJ): Educating 
Counselor (INFJ): Guiding 
Advocate (NFP) 
Mediating 
Champion (ENFP): Motivating 
Healer (INFP): Conciliating 
Rational (NT) 
Strategic 
Coordinator (NTJ) 
Arranging 
Field marshal (ENTJ): Mobilizing 
Mastermind (INTJ): Entailing 
Engineer (NTP) 
Constructing 
Inventor (ENTP): Devising 
Architect (INTP): Designing 
Observant 
(S) 
Guardian (SJ) 
Logistical 
Administrator (STJ) 
Regulating 
Supervisor (ESTJ): Enforcing 
Inspector (ISTJ): Certifying 
Conservator (SFJ) 
Supporting 
Provider (ESFJ): Supplying 
Protector (ISFJ): Securing 
Artisan (SP) 
Tactical 
Operator (STP) 
Expediting 
Promoter (ESTP): Persuading 
Crafter (ISTP): Instrumenting 
Entertainer (SFP) 
Improvising 
Performer (ESFP): Demonstrating 
Composer (ISFP): Synthesizing 
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Table 4  provides a descriptive meaning of each letter, which in combination 
describes the characteristics of each unique personality. 
 
Table 4  
Summary of Individual Components of the Different Personality Types 
Letter Name Meaning 
E Extraversion Feel motivated by interaction with people. Tend to enjoy a wide circle of acquaintances, and gain energy in social situations 
N Intuition 
More abstract than concrete. Focus attention on the big picture 
rather than the details, and on future possibilities rather than 
immediate realities 
F Feeling 
Value personal considerations above objective criteria. When 
making decisions, often give more weight to social implications 
than to logic 
J Judgment Plan activities and make decisions early. Derive a sense of control through predictability 
I Introversion 
Quiet and reserved. Generally prefer interacting with a few 
close friends rather than a wide circle of acquaintances, and 
expend energy in social situations 
P Perception Withhold judgment and delay important decisions, preferring to "keep their options open" should circumstances change 
T Thinking 
Value objective criteria above personal preference. When 
making decisions, generally give more weight to logic than to 
social considerations 
S Sensing 
More concrete than abstract. Focus attention on the details 
rather than the big picture, and on 
immediate realities rather than future possibilities 
 
 
The results define four main personality types as noted by (Guhya, 2010): 
i. Idealist (NF). 
ii. Rational (NT). 
iii. Guardian (SJ). 
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iv. Artisan (SP). 
Berens and Cooper (2001) summarize the key elements to the four primary 
personalities as: 
i. Artisans are known to be observant and practical. They have notable skill set in 
crafting, performing and composing with their highest strength being tactical 
variation. 
ii. Guardians excel at facilitating, checking and organizing and are more concerned 
with responsibility and duty. They are observant and supportive in their nature. 
iii. Idealists seek their own unique identity and are prominent in their diplomatic 
intelligence. They are introspective and cooperative and place a high skill 
importance in inspiring, clarifying and individualizing. 
iv. Rational are introspective and pragmatic. They personality type is excel in 
logical investigation, conceptualizing and coordinating. They are deeply 
concerned with their own knowledge, have a good potency in strategic 
intelligence and seek self-control. 
Panchal (2007) opined that RAB process is heavily influenced by personal 
behavior and individual characteristics. Chouhan (2009) observed and defined the clear 
difference among the aggressive and average bidders. Chaudhari (2009) and Saigaonkar 
(2010) proposed that this may be due to differences in the  personality types of the 
bidders, which has now been studied in some detail as part of the TAMU work. Their 
results showed that the bidders with Guardians (SJ) personality type are the most 
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economically effective bidders. However as Petersen (2011) noted in his conclusions as 
the definition of a Type ξ player: 
This research shows that guardians do not perform equally in a game. The 
definition of a Type ξ player may include guardian as one of the defining elements, but it 
is not exclusive. Future research is recommended using a larger selection pool to obtain 
a full set of non-guardians to meet the original objective of the research. 
Now more research has been done to get into deeper analysis about the Guardian. 
Guardian consists of four types of roles – Supervisor, Inspector, Provider and Protector. 
Some experts suggest that research can be focused on the difference among these four 
types of personalities, and determine if one of these four types perform best in the game 
with highest profits and lowest jobs.  
 
 van Vleet’s RAB Game  
   Game Introduction 
Reverse auction bidding is a new purchasing method in the construction industry. 
Though it has been somewhat proved effective, efficient and economical in the 
manufacturing industry, no significant research has been done for the construction 
industry. In Guhya (2010) research, he considered the RAB game developed by van 
Vleet could be considered as an algorithm. The algorithmic process is shown in Figure 3.  
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Figure 3. Reverse Auction Bidding General Algorithm after Guhya (2010) 
 
For the research work completed by van Vleet in 2004, a RAB scenario was 
created. But since van Vleet’s professional paper was not published, it is necessary to 
explain it again. In the scenario van Vleet (2004)  created, each participant acts as an 
independent contractor working for a production home builder. All the contractors need 
to finish the work so the purchaser can construct a home, and they are going to compete 
with each other on one particular type of subcontract work, which is a slab construction. 
In order to simplify the game, van Vleet assumed that the home builder only builds one 
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type of house, which is not far from the truth for production builders. In this way, each 
contractor only needs to build one type of slab.  
This assumption largely reduces the qualification requirements for each 
contractor so the final results can better show the efficiency of RAB. The game is 
assumed to happen in six suburbs in the Greater Houston area. As shown in the Figure 4. 
(The six suburbs are highlighted with red stars.)  
 
 
Figure 4. Construction Site Locations in Houston after MapQuest (2006) and 
(Guhya, 2010) 
 
Table 5 shows the distance from each site to the main contractor’s office in 
Sugarland. 
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Table 5  
Site Location Details 
Site # Location of Development 
Distance from Sugarland 
(miles) 
1 Brookside Village 28.8 
2 Piney Point Village 14.9 
3 Highlands 40.5 
4 Jersey Village 28.8 
5 Brunker Hill Village 16.9 
6 Richmond 8.9 
 
 
Since the work is repetitive, it is assumed the experience and qualifications are 
not the most important factors for this bidding process. The bidding price is what matters 
most.  
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Every Monday the owner will post the jobs and all the related information, 
including the location of the jobs, estimated cost of the jobs, etc., on the ASP based 
website (Kingsley-Hughes, Kingsley-Hughes, & Read, 2004) for that week, and then all 
the bidders log on to the web site and starting bidding for the jobs. The web site was first 
created by W. Kim (2004) for van Vleet, including a major upgrade to SQL Server by 
Wellington (2006). All current research uses the SQL Server system. 
Figure 5 shows the login screen for the game. Figure 6 shows a sample data 
collection screen for one of the bidders. From the figure, it clearly shows that the process 
is in the week 159 with five completed jobs, zero jobs in process and zero bids ongoing 
now. If the bidding process is ongoing, then every week when the bidder gets some jobs, 
it will be shown in the Jobs in Progress Screen. If the bidding is not over, and at that 
time, the bidder provides the lowest price for some job, then it will be shown in My 
Active Jobs Screen. Besides, all the information about those completed jobs (the 
location, the bid amount, the job start date, etc.) is posted here.  
 
 
  
35 35 
 
Figure 5. Reverse Auction Bidding Login Screen
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Figure 6. Reverse Auction Bidding - Sample Data Screen
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Table 6 shows the construction costs for each site. The aim is to make the 
bidding system as realistic as possible. 
 
Table 6  
Location of the Construction Sites in Houston 
Site 
# 
Location of 
Development 
Distance from 
Sugarland 
(miles) 
Travel Cost 
($) 
Delivery 
Cost ($) 
Total Cost 
($) 
Site 
1 
Brookside 
Village 
42 858 624 1482 
Site 
2 
Piney Point 
Village 
24 495 360 855 
Site 
3 
Highlands 70 1452 1056 2508 
Site 
4 
Jersey Village 40 825 600 1425 
Site 
5 
Bunker Hill 
Village 
27 561 408 969 
Site 
6 
Richmond 14 297 216 513 
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      Specific Assumptions 
The assumptions are: 
1. The total duration of the game will be a maximum of nine consecutive weeks; 
2. All bidders initially have an equal dollar amount of $40,000 available in their bank 
accounts; 
3. The original cost for every job is estimated to be $10,000 excluding the travel costs 
and the delivery costs. The values of these costs are posted along the job site address; 
4. The duration for completing each job is assumed to be five days, excluding the rain 
delay; 
5. The work week is assumed to be five days long i.e. from Monday to Friday; 
6. Initially, every bidder will only be allowed to work on three jobs in a week; 
7. If a bidder decides to undertake more than three jobs in a week, then the bidder will 
have to take a loan from the bank. The additional charge for each loan is $500 and 
this will be automatically charged irrespective of the fact that they have won the bid 
or not; 
8. Since the base cost for all jobs is $10,000, and the default duration is five days, the 
cost accumulated is $2000 per day for all jobs. The travel expenses and the delivery 
charges would also be summed up on a daily basis accordingly depending upon the 
location; 
9. The location of the owner is assumed to be located in Sugar Land, Texas and thus the 
additional expenses for travel and delivery are assumed on the basis of the proximity 
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of the job site from this place. The offices of the subcontractors are also assumed to 
be in Sugar Land, Texas; 
10. The minimum acceptable return on investment derived from long term construction 
industry standards is 10%. However, this would not be tested during the game and 
the players would be cautioned of this condition; 
11. Payment for work is scheduled to be delivered at the completion of 5th construction 
day; 
12. The primary objective of all the bidders is to maximize their profits while 
maintaining bank assurance and satisfactory liquidity. 
 
    Rain Delay 
For any construction site, rain is a problem for the development of an efficient 
process. In this research, the rain delay is also considered as a part of the bidding 
process. In van Vleet’s research, the rain possibility was assumed to be 30% per day, in 
line with average rain days for Houston (van Vleet, 2004). All the data was obtained 
from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) web page for the 
study to provide a random array of rain days for the game as shown in Figure 7. 
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Figure 7. Sample Weather Map for Houston, after NOAA (2012) 
 
 
Table 7 shows a sample of the rain delay table. 
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Table 7  
Rain Delays for Week One 
Day 
Site 
One Two Three Four Five Six 
Monday 1 0 0 0 1 0 
Tuesday 0 1 1 0 0 0 
Wednesday 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Thursday 0 0 1 0 0 1 
Friday 1 0 0 0 1 1 
Saturday 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
 
 
As it is shown in the figure, there are two numbers – 1 and 0 here. Wherever 
there is a number 1, it means a rain delay, while number 0 is the opposite. The rain 
delays are a big influence on the work efficiency. Any delays may result in the work 
capacity for each participant during the rest the construction work, which may change 
the final completion date. 
In this Reverse Auction Bidding process, the price needs to go lower each time. 
On the ASP based website only a lower than the current price bid will be accepted. If the 
bidder enters an inappropriate price, a notice will be shown on the screen to warn the 
bidder about the price submitted. 
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CHAPTER III  
METHODOLOGY  
 
 Introduction 
The game setup was described in the Literature Review. This methodology 
describes the three multiplayer games used in this research project. The methodology has 
the following sections: 
1. Game Setup unique to this research; 
2. Data Collection. 
 
 Game Setup 
This study used three separate games to replicate the work by Gregory (2006) 
with Game 1  having three bidders, Game 2 having four bidders and Game 3 having ten 
bidders. 
Each game followed this procedure: 
1. Each test was conducted at a specified place and a specific time; 
2. Before each test, all the participants will sit together and first finish the 
KTS personality test; 
3. Then a short and brief introduction about the rules and the regulations will 
be given to the participants; 
4. Each participant was given a unique logon username and password, and 
then they will start their own bidding process; 
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5. Communication and any kind of discussion was forbidden during the 
testing time to make sure each individual would use their own strategy to 
bid the projects. 
 
 Data Collection 
The section on data collection is common to all TAMU Reverse Auction Bidding 
Studies and the key elements are kindly taken from the paper by (Plumber, 2010). The 
key elements are presented below. 
Every participant of the RAB game was assigned a unique username and 
password to access the RAB website. The usernames assume random company names 
samples of which are as follows: 
i. Driver Co. 
ii. Pliers Co. 
iii. Concrete Co. 
iv. Hammer Co.  
All the needed information related to bid process such as the cost of the job, all 
current bids, and the bidder’s company name were made available to the bidders once 
they logged into the website using their unique usernames. The purpose is to present the 
needed bid information and thus improve the bidder’s ability to respond in real time. 
After logging on to the server the participants were directed to the All Current 
Bids Screen   as shown in  Figure 8. The All Current Bids screen shows all the 
information about the jobs such as the estimated cost, travel cost, delivery cost, 
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approximate profit and profit percentage. It also contained the My Bids column, in this 
column the bidder can insert their bid amount and click on Submit button to place each 
bid. Only one bid can be placed at a time. 
Once a bid is placed all information was available to all the bidders. Each 
bidding session went on for 15 minutes and a different number of bidding sessions took 
place with a five minute break between each session in each game. As for all games, 
bidders were unable to place bids before the commencement of the bidding and after the 
end of the sessions. 
As mentioned in the literature review, each bidder was constrained to bid on only    three 
jobs within a given week without penalty. To bid on more than three jobs each 
participant had the cost option of taking a loan from the bank, for which a fee of $500 
was deducted from the bidder’s available bank balance. The All Current Bids Screen, as 
shown in Figure 8. Figure 9 shows the form provided upon taking out a bank loan. 
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 Figure 8. All Current Bids Screen 
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Figure 9. Bank Guarantee Form 
 
In the RAB game the bidder is only allowed to bid lower than an already placed bid, 
as it is a reverse auction and one has to follow the rules. If the bidder bids an amount 
higher than the current bid the following notification, Figure 10, will be shown to the 
bidder who can then respond to the rule infraction. 
 
Figure 10. Higher than Acceptable Bid Screen 
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Figure 11. Jobs in Progress Screen 
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 After the end of each fifteen minute bid session the task would be automatically 
awarded to the lowest bidder for each job. To see information regarding, what jobs have 
been won by a bidder, each bidder can go to the My Jobs in Progress Screen which 
provides the relevant information about the jobs won, refer to Figure 11. 
 Figure 11 provides relevant financial information so that the bidder has a better 
idea about how many jobs can be bid on in the following week and how much money the 
bidder would have to borrow from the bank in order to bid on future jobs his information 
can be seen under the sub heading of My Summary and it shows the following relevant 
information: 
i. Current calculated cash assets; 
ii. Capacity for additional works including jobs with bank guarantees; 
iii. Cumulative loan charges till date; 
iv. Current financial condition. 
 Current financial condition (van Vleet, 2004) displays information regarding the 
working capital to the participants. The initial capital of $40,000 is allotted to each 
player at the beginning of the game and the bank guarantee is $500 per loan. The 
formula used to calculate the working capital is: 
Current Financial Condition = (Capital + Profits) – (Costs of Current Jobs + Bank Costs) 
 Figure 12 shows the All Completed Jobs Screen which displays information 
regarding the completed jobs. The bidder can view the status of the jobs they have won, 
whether the jobs are completed or are still running due to rain delays so that they can 
determine strategy for further bidding. 
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Figure 12. All Completed Jobs Screen 
50 
 
 
CHAPTER IV  
RESULTS  
 
 Introduction 
The results of this research are provided in three stages. 
1. Personality testing. 
2. RAB Game Results Sections. 
3. Analysis. 
 
 Personality Testing 
   Background 
Previous studies had used personality type as a selection criteria, (Plumber, 
2010), but this study did not control for personality. The personality results are given for 
the three games.  
 
   Game 1 Three Player 
 Table 8 provides the personality types of the bidders in the three player game. 
Previous research findings suggest that the guardians will have the best economic 
performance in this game. Participant Three had the best economic returns for the game, 
which was not expected from previous research. No work has yet differentiated the ξ 
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player, defined as the best player including personality traits, although Petersen (2011) 
tried to look at this knotty problem. This is an area of future research. 
 
Table 8  
Personality of the Participants in the Three Bidder Game 
Participant Identifier Personality Type 
One ESFJ: Guardians Conservator Provider 
Two ESFJ: Guardians Conservator Provider 
Three ESFP: Artisans Entertainer Performer 
 
 
   Game 2 Four Player 
Table 9 provides the personality types of the bidders in the four player game. 
Participant One had the best economic returns for the game, as was expected from 
previous research, this may provide further data to support the study by Petersen (2011) 
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Table 9  
Personality of the Participants in the Four Bidder Game 
Participant Identifier Personality Type 
One ESTJ: Guardians Administrator Supervisor 
Two ISFJ: Guardians Conservator Protector 
Three ESFJ: Guardians Conservator Provider 
Four ESTJ: Guardians Administrator Supervisor 
 
 
   Game 3 Ten Player 
 Table 10 provides the personality types of the bidders in the ten player game. 
Participant One had the best economic returns for the game, as was expected from 
previous research. 
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Table 10  
Personality of the Participants in the Ten Bidder Game 
Participant Identifier Personality Type 
One INTP: Rationals Engineer Architect 
Two ESFP: Artisans Entertainer Performer 
Three ESFP: Artisans Entertainer Performer 
Four ESTJ: Guardians Administrator Supervisor 
Five INFP: Idealists Advocate Healer 
Six ESTP: Artisans Operator Promoter 
Seven ISTJ:  Guardians Administrator Inspector 
Eight ESFJ: Guardians Conservator Provider 
Nine ISTJ: Guardians Administrator Inspector 
Ten ESTJ: Guardians Administrator Supervisor 
 
 
Game Results 
   Introduction 
 This analysis of the results follows the traditional methods developed in prior 
studies. Chouhan (2009) showed that in the Reverse Auction Bidding usually the bid 
process can be divided into four periods – Learning, Discovering, Competitive and Profit 
Gain. 
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   Game 1 Three Player Bid Process 
Figure 13 shows the profit plotted against job number.  
 
Figure 13. Profit to Different Jobs (3-bidders) 
 
Table 11 shows the proposed trend periods to ascertain if Chouhan’s theory 
applies at a three bidder game.  
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Table 11  
Trend Period in Three Bidder Game 
Description of the Trend Period Job at Start of Period Job at End of Period 
Trend 1 1 21 
Trend 2 22 26 
Trend 3 27 43 
 
 
 Student’s t Test analysis is typically used to determine if the trend period results 
are distinct (Miller & Freund, 1976). The results for the t Test are shown in Table 12. 
 
Table 12  
Student's t-Test Analysis of the Trend Periods (3-Bidders) 
Period 1 2 3 
1 - 0.58 0.51 
2 -0.58 - -0.18 
3 -0.51 0.18 - 
 
 
The results show that probably due to the tacit collusion in the three bidder game, 
there are no trends shown on the graph, as shown by the results of the t-Test. There are 
no perceived trends in this game. This finding can be cross checked against Gregory 
(2006) results when they are re-analyzed using more up to date theory. 
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In considering the Herfindahl Index for the first three player games, the Index for 
the 3-bidder game is 3333, which is larger than the nominal limit set by the Justice 
Department at 1800 (van Vleet, 2004). So it is considered to be a concentrated market. 
The increase in market concentration means a decrease in the efficiency and 
competitiveness and the increase of chances of the tacit collusion. This may also 
explains why there are no periods in the results. 
 
   Game 2 Four Player Bid Process 
Figure 14 shows the profit against the jobs for the four bidder game. 
 
 
Figure 14. Profit to Different Jobs (4-bidders) 
 
Table 13 shows the proposed trend periods to ascertain if Chouhan’s theory 
applies at this four bidder game as it has at others, (Chouhan, 2009). 
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Table 13  
Trend Period in Four Bidder Game 
Description of the Trend Period Job at Start of Period Job at End of Period 
Learning (1) 1 8 
Discovering (2) 9 11 
Competitive (3) 12 15 
Profit Gain (4) 16 37 
 
 
A Student’s t Test analysis is typically used to determine if the trend period 
results are distinct. The results for the t Test are shown in Table 14. 
 
Table 14  
Student's t-Test Analysis of the Trend Periods (4-Bidders) 
Period 1 2 3 4 
1 - -1.52 -2.69 -11.48 
2 1.52 - 1.33 -1.40 
3 -0.51 0.18 - -10.80 
4 11.48 1.40 10.80 - 
 
 
From the 4-bidder game, it is statistically evident there are four trend periods. In 
the learning period, bidders tend to bid with low profits to get familiar with the game. 
58 
 
 
Then bidders try to increase the profit a little which is the discovering period. Being 
more familiar with the game, the competitive period came and resulted in the low profits 
again. But it is a short period, bidders figured out the strategy to this game, then the 
profit gain period started and most bidders began to gain profits. And the t-Test also 
shows the trend 1, 2 and 3 are quite competitive. In the 4-bidder game, the Herfindahl 
Index is 2500, which is still larger than 1800, so the tacit collusion may still exist, but it 
is much more competitive than the 3-bidder game. 
 
   Game 3 Ten Player Bid Process 
Figure 15 shows the profit data for the ten bidder game. 
 
 
Figure 15. Profit to Different Jobs (10-bidders) 
 
 Table 15 shows the suggested trend periods for the ten player game. 
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Table 15  
Trend Period in Ten Bidder Game 
Description of the Trend Period Job at Start of Period Job at End of Period 
Discovering (1) 1 22 
Competitive (2) 23 69 
Profit Gain (3) 70 109 
 
 
Table 16 shows the ten bidder game’s Student t Test results for the suggested 
game periods. 
 
Table 16  
Student's t-Test Analysis of the Trend Periods (10-Bidders) 
Period 1 2 3 
1 - 0.97 4.99 
2 -0.97 - 7.26 
3 -4.99 -7.26 - 
 
 
 
The data in the graph shows that there are only three trends in the bidding process. 
The bidding process went directly into the discovering period. Besides, the competitive 
period is a little longer than the other two games. And the statistical analysis shows that 
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the competitive period is as competitive as the discovering period. The Herfindahl Index 
for the 10-bidder game is 1000, which means open competition. So it has the fiercest 
competition among all the three games.  
 
 Descriptive Statistics of The Bid Data 
   Game One Three Bidders 
The comparison of the number of bids and the number of jobs per week for each test is 
shown in Table 17.  
 
Table 17  
No. of Jobs and Bids per Week (3-bidder) 
Week Jobs/Week Bids/Week 
1 7 16 
2 7 11 
3 8 10 
4 5 17 
5 6 11 
6 4 11 
7 6 6 
Total 43 82 
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    Game Two Four Bidders 
The comparison of the number of bids and the number of jobs per week for each test is 
shown in Table 18.  
 
Table 18  
No. of Jobs and Bids per Week (4-bidder) 
Week Jobs/Week Bids/Week 
1 4 27 
2 6 22 
3 11 21 
4 9 17 
5 7 18 
Total 37 105 
 
 
   Game Three Ten Bidders 
The comparison of the number of bids and the number of jobs per week for each 
test is shown in Table 19. 
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Table 19  
No. of Jobs and Bids per Week (10-bidder) 
Week Jobs/Week Bids/Week 
1 22 25 
2 19 204 
3 18 120 
4 10 107 
5 14 78 
6 26 54 
Total 109 588 
 
 
 Jobs Won By Bidders 
   Game One Three Bidder 
In order to observe among different participants, Table 20 shows the number of 
bids and the number of jobs won by all the participants.  
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Table 20  
Rank, No. of Bids and Jobs Won (3-bidder) 
Rank Participant No. of Bids Jobs Won 
1 3 30 21 
2 2 32 19 
3 1 21 3 
 
 
 
   Game Two Four Bidder 
Table 21 shows the number of bids and the number of jobs won by all the 
participants.  
 
Table 21  
Rank, No. of Bids and Jobs Won (4-bidder) 
Rank Participant No. of Bids Jobs Won 
1 1 40 21 
2 4 23 7 
3 3 27 6 
4 2 15 3 
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      Game Three Ten Bidder 
Table 22 shows the number of bids and the number of jobs won by participants. 
 
Table 22  
Rank, No. of Bids and Jobs Won (10-bidder) 
Rank Participant No. of Bids Jobs Won 
1 1 65 16 
2 7 15 8 
3 9 108 9 
4 4 58 11 
5 3 57 15 
6 8 74 4 
7 6 70 4 
8 2 72 4 
9 10 22 7 
10 5 47 10 
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Bank Loans 
   Introduction 
The profits and the bank loan to each participant are shown in the tables below. 
In previous games, the bank loan rate has been a good indicator of performance. 
 
   Game One Three Bidder 
Table 23 shows the data relevant to loans taken out by the bidders for this game. 
 
Table 23  
Rank, No. of Bids and Jobs Won (Three Bidder) 
Rank Participant Bank Loan ($) Profit ($) 
1 3 5500 570583 
2 2 8000 524440 
3 1 4500 81258 
 
 
 
 Figure 16 shows the bank loan plotted against profit. Whilst the relationship is 
weaker than traditionally observed the results are consistent with previous findings. 
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Figure 16. Relationship between Profits and Bank Loan (3-bidders) 
   
 Game Two Four Bidder 
Table 24 shows the data relevant to loans taken out by the bidders for this game. 
 
Table 24  
Rank, No. of Bids and Jobs Won (Four Bidder) 
Rank Participant Bank Loan ($) Profit ($) 
1 1 10500 265120 
2 4 2500 137797 
3 3 2000 129650 
4 2 0 79598 
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Figure 17 shows the bank loan plotted against profit. The relationship shows the 
traditional strength. 
 
 
Figure 17. Relationship between Profits and Bank Loan (4-bidders) 
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   Game Three Ten Bidder 
Table 25 shows the data relevant to loans taken out by the bidders for this game. 
 
Table 25  
Rank, No. of Bids and Jobs Won (Ten Bidder) 
Rank Participant Bank Loan ($) Profit ($) 
1 1 11000 232555 
2 7 1000 124380 
3 9 8500 84863 
4 4 7500 81723 
5 3 11500 77404 
6 8 3500 62272 
7 6 500 15108 
8 2 10000 3675 
9 10 2000 809 
10 5 16000 498 
 
 
 
 Figure 18 shows the bank loan relationship. Clearly the results point to the 
known relationship between bank loans and performance. The three poor performers are 
noted for future research.  
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Figure 18. Relationship between Profits and Bank Loan (10-bidders) 
 
Tables below show the bid efficiency for the three games. In the 3-bidder and the 
4-bidder game, higher rank participants tend to have higher bid efficiency. But in the 10-
bidder game, there is no relationship like this. So from the data it show in the Reverse 
Auction Bidding process, the bidders with higher bid efficiency can gain more profits 
among a small number of bidders, while the bid efficiency is not related to the profits in 
a large number of bidders. 
 
70 
 
 
 Bid Efficiency  
Table 26 , Table 27 and Table 28 show the bid efficiency of the players in each 
game. The results are consistent with previous findings 
 
Table 26  
3-bidder Bid Efficiency 
Rank Participant No. of Bids Jobs Won Bid Efficiency (%) 
1 3 30 21 70 
2 2 32 19 59.38 
3 1 21 3 14.29 
 
 
 
Table 27  
4-bidder Bid Efficiency 
Rank Participant No. of Bids Jobs Won Bid Efficiency (%) 
1 1 40 21 52.50 
2 4 23 7 30.43 
3 3 27 6 22.22 
4 2 15 3 20.00 
 
 
 
71 
 
 
Table 28  
10-bidder Bid Efficiency 
 
Rank Participant No. of Bids Jobs Won Bid Efficiency (%) 
1 1 65 16 24.62 
2 7 15 8 53.33 
3 9 108 9 8.33 
4 4 58 11 18.97 
5 3 57 15 26.32 
6 8 74 4 5.41 
7 6 70 4 5.71 
8 2 72 4 5.56 
9 10 22 7 31.82 
10 5 47 10 21.28 
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Descriptive Statistics of The Won Job Data 
Table 30 and Table 31 show another important aspect for the bidders – the profit 
efficiency. There is no big difference among the bidders in the 3-bidder game. In the 4-
bidder game, the participants with highest profits tend to have lowest profit efficiency, 
which means they bid a lot of jobs with low profits. In the 10-bidde game, there is a 
trend that the bidders with the higher profits also have the higher profit efficiency, 
though bidder 6 is an exception. Bidder 6 bid all the four jobs with a very high profit, 
which brings the highest profit efficiency among all the bidders, and the personality type 
is “Promoter”. 
 
Table 29  
3-bidder Profit Efficiency 
Rank Participant No. of Bids Jobs Won Profit Efficiency ($) 
1 3 30 21 27086.00 
2 2 32 19 27602.11 
3 1 21 3 27170.62 
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Table 30  
4 -bidder Profit Efficiency 
Rank Participant No. of Bids Jobs Won Profit Efficiency ($) 
1 1 40 21 12624.76 
2 4 23 7 19685.29 
3 3 27 6 21608.33 
4 2 15 3 26532.67 
 
 
 
Table 31  
10-bidder Profit Efficiency 
Rank Participant No. of Bids Jobs Won Profit Efficiency ($) 
1 1 65 16 14534.69 
2 7 15 8 15547.50 
3 9 108 9 9429.22 
4 4 58 11 7429.36 
5 3 57 15 5160.27 
6 8 74 4 15568.00 
7 6 70 4 3777.00 
8 2 72 4 918.75 
9 10 22 7 115.57 
10 5 47 10 49.80 
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Figure 19, Figure 20 and Figure 21 shows the percentage of jobs won in 
descending rank order. The results are consistent with earlier findings on this area of the 
game. 
 
 
Figure 19. 3-bidder Participants Jobs Won Ranking 
 
  
Figure 20. 4-bidder Participants Jobs Won Ranking 
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Figure 21. 10-bidder Participants Jobs Won Ranking 
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Figure 22 shows the first participants histogram of profits for the jobs won.  
 
 
Figure 22. Participant One Histogram of Profit Percentage for Jobs (3-bidder) 
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Figure 23 and Figure 24 show the other two participants histogram of profits for 
the jobs won. The relative efficiency of these last two players is evident.  
 
 
Figure 23. Participant Two Histogram of Profit Percentage for Jobs (3-bidder) 
 
 
Figure 24. Participant Three Histogram of Profit Percentage for Jobs (3-bidder) 
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Figure 25 and Figure 26 show the first two participants profit percentage. 
 
 
Figure 25. Participant One Histogram of Profit Percentage for Jobs (4-bidder) 
 
 
Figure 26. Participant Two Histogram of Profit Percentage for Jobs (4-bidder) 
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 Figure 27 and Figure 28 show the next two. 
 
 
Figure 27. Participant Three Histogram of Profit Percentage for Jobs (4-bidder) 
 
 
Figure 28. Participant Four Histogram of Profit Percentage for Jobs (4-bidder) 
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Figure 29 through to Figure 38 show the results for the ten bidder game. 
 
 
Figure 29. Participant One Histogram of Profit Percentage for Jobs (10-bidder) 
 
 
Figure 30. Participant Two Histogram of Profit Percentage for Jobs (10-bidder) 
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Figure 31. Participant Three Histogram of Profit Percentage for Jobs (10-bidder) 
 
 
Figure 32. Participant Four Histogram of Profit Percentage for Jobs (10-bidder) 
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Figure 33. Participant Five Histogram of Profit Percentage for Jobs (10-bidder) 
 
 
Figure 34. Participant Six Histogram of Profit Percentage for Jobs (10-bidder) 
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Figure 35. Participant Seven Histogram of Profit Percentage for Jobs (10-bidder) 
 
 
Figure 36. Participant Eight Histogram of Profit Percentage for Jobs (10-bidder) 
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Figure 37. Participant Nine Histogram of Profit Percentage for Jobs (10-bidder) 
 
 
Figure 38. Participant Ten Histogram of Profit Percentage for Jobs (10-bidder) 
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The following Figure 39 to Figure 44 shows the bidding frequency of the best 
performer in each test and the bidding frequency of all the participants in each game. 
 
 
Figure 39. Histogram of Best Performer Profit Percentages (3-bidder) 
 
 
Figure 40. Histogram of All Participants Profit Percentages (3-bidder) 
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Figure 41. Histogram of Best Performer Profit Percentages (4-bidder) 
 
 
Figure 42. Histogram of All Participants Profit Percentages (4-bidder) 
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Figure 43. Histogram of Best Performer Profit Percentages (10-bidder)  
 
 
Figure 44. Histogram of All Participants Profit Percentages (10-bidder) 
 
 Bid Period Comparison 
Table 32 through to Table 51 show the bidding pattern for each participant and all 
the participants in the three games. 
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Table 32  
Bids Made in 15-minute Time Intervals - Participant 1 (3-bidder) 
Bid Periods 
Time 
(mins) 
17:50- 
18:05 
18:10- 
18:25 
18:30- 
18:45 
18:50- 
19:05 
19:10- 
19:25 
19:30- 
19:45 
1   2 1 3 2 
2   1 2  1 
3       
4  1     
5  1     
6 1      
7 1      
8 2      
9 1      
10     10  
11       
12       
13       
14       
15       
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Table 33  
Bids Made in 15-minute Time Intervals - Participant 2 (3-bidder) 
Bid Periods 
Time 
(mins) 
17:50- 
18:05 
18:10- 
18:25 
18:30- 
18:45 
18:50- 
19:05 
19:10- 
19:25 
19:30- 
19:45 
1 1     2 
2   3 3  1 
3 2      
4  3    1 
5     3  
6  1     
7 2      
8    3   
9       
10 2      
11       
12       
13       
14  1     
15      1 
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Table 34  
Bids Made in 15-minute Time Intervals - Participant 3 (3-bidder) 
Bid Periods 
Time 
(mins) 
17:50- 
18:05 
18:10- 
18:25 
18:30- 
18:45 
18:50- 
19:05 
19:10- 
19:25 
19:30- 
19:45 
1      1 
2   1 2 1  
3    1  1 
4  1     
5  2     
6       
7   2    
8 1 1     
9 2    1  
10 1      
11       
12       
13       
14       
15  1 1 5 1 1 
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Table 35  
Bids Made in 15-minute Time Intervals – All Participants (3-bidder) 
Bid Periods 
Time 
(mins) 
17:50- 
18:05 
18:10- 
18:25 
18:30- 
18:45 
18:50- 
19:05 
19:10- 
19:25 
19:30- 
19:45 
1 1  2 1 3 5 
2 0  5 7 1 2 
3 2   1 0 1 
4 0 5  0 0 1 
5 0 3  0 3  
6 1 1  0   
7 3  2 0   
8 3 1  3   
9 3   0 1  
10 3   0 2  
11 0   0 0  
12 0   0 0  
13 0   0   
14 0 1  0   
15 0 1 1 5 1 2 
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Table 36  
Bids Made in 15-minute Time Intervals - Participant 1 (4-bidder) 
Bid Periods 
     Time 
(mins) 
18:20- 
18:35 
18:40- 
18:55 
19:00- 
19:15 
19:20- 
19:35 
19:40- 
19:55 
1 1 1    
2 1 3  3  
3 1 2  3  
4  1 4  4 
5      
6      
7 2  2   
8 1  2   
9      
10      
11      
12 3     
13      
14      
15 1 1 1 2 2 
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Table 37  
Bids Made in 15-minute Time Intervals - Participant 2 (4-bidder) 
Bid Periods 
Time 
(mins) 
18:20- 
18:35 
18:40- 
18:55 
19:00- 
19:15 
19:20- 
19:35 
19:40- 
19:55 
1  1    
2 1     
3 1  2  1 
4      
5 1     
6      
7      
8      
9    1  
10      
11      
12      
13      
14      
15 1 2  2 2 
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Table 38  
Bids Made in 15-minute Time Intervals - Participant 3 (4-bidder) 
Bid Periods 
Time 
(mins) 
18:20- 
18:35 
18:40- 
18:55 
19:00- 
19:15 
19:20- 
19:35 
19:40- 
19:55 
1  2  1  
2   2 1  
3 2 1  1 2 
4      
5 1     
6      
7      
8      
9  1    
10      
11      
12      
13      
14      
15 1 1 2 3 5 
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Table 39  
Bids Made in 15-minute Time Intervals - Participant 4 (4-bidder) 
Bid Periods 
Time 
(mins) 
18:20- 
18:35 
18:40- 
18:55 
19:00- 
19:15 
19:20- 
19:35 
19:40- 
19:55 
1  1  3 2 
2   3   
3 1     
4 1 1    
5 1     
6 1     
7      
8      
9 1     
10      
11      
12  2    
13      
14      
15 1 1 2   
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Table 40  
Bids Made in 15-minute Time Intervals – All Participants (4-bidder) 
Bid Periods 
Time 
(mins) 
18:20- 
18:35 
18:40- 
18:55 
19:00- 
19:15 
19:20- 
19:35 
19:40- 
19:55 
1 1 5 0 4 2 
2 2 3 5 4 0 
3 5 3 2 1 3 
4 1 2 4 0 4 
5 3 0 0 0 0 
6 1 0 0 0 0 
7 2 0 2 0 0 
8 1 0 2 0 0 
9 1 1 0 1 0 
10 0 0 0 0 0 
11 1 0 0 0 0 
12 3 2 0 0 0 
13 0 0 0 0 0 
14 0 0 0 0 0 
15 3 5 5 7 9 
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Table 41  
Bids Made in 15-minute Time Intervals - Participant 1 (10-bidder) 
Bid Periods 
Time 
(mins) 
17:40- 
17:55 
18:00- 
18:15 
18:20- 
18:35 
18:40- 
18:55 
19:00- 
19:15 
19:20- 
19:35 
1       
2  1 1    
3  3 3    
4  2 2    
5  2 2 2   
6  3 1 1   
7  3 1 1   
8  3 2 1   
9  3 2    
10 1 2     
11 2 4     
12  2     
13  1    2 
14  5   2  
15  4   1  
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Table 42  
Bids Made in 15-minute Time Intervals - Participant 2 (10-bidder) 
Bid Periods 
Time 
(mins) 
17:40- 
17:55 
18:00- 
18:15 
18:20- 
18:35 
18:40- 
18:55 
19:00- 
19:15 
19:20- 
19:35 
1  1  1   
2  1  1   
3  1 2 1   
4  3 2 1   
5  1 1 2  3 
6  1 1 2  1 
7  2 1 3   
8  1 2 1   
9 1  1 3   
10  2 2 1   
11    1   
12 1 1  3   
13    5 2  
14 1 1  1 1  
15 1 1  4 3 1 
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Table 43  
Bids Made in 15-minute Time Intervals - Participant 3 (10-bidder) 
Bid Periods 
Time 
(mins) 
17:40- 
17:55 
18:00- 
18:15 
18:20- 
18:35 
18:40- 
18:55 
19:00- 
19:15 
19:20- 
19:35 
1       
2       
3  1     
4  1 1  2  
5   1    
6  1 2  1  
7   2 4   
8   2 1   
9       
10   1    
11  1     
12  1    1 
13   2 2 2 2 
14  5  1 2 4 
15  5  1 3 5 
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Table 44  
Bids Made in 15-minute Time Intervals - Participant 4 (10-bidder) 
Bid Periods 
Time 
(mins) 
17:40- 
17:55 
18:00- 
18:15 
18:20- 
18:35 
18:40- 
18:55 
19:00- 
19:15 
19:20- 
19:35 
1       
2  1     
3  1     
4  2     
5  1     
6  1  1   
7  1 1 1   
8   1 2   
9  1 1    
10  1 2    
11    2   
12   1 2 3 3 
13  1  2 1 3 
14  2 2 3 1 2 
15  2 2 1 2 4 
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Table 45  
Bids Made in 15-minute Time Intervals - Participant 5 (10-bidder) 
Bid Periods 
Time 
(mins) 
17:40- 
17:55 
18:00- 
18:15 
18:20- 
18:35 
18:40- 
18:55 
19:00- 
19:15 
19:20- 
19:35 
1   1    
2  3 6    
3  2 3    
4  1 1    
5       
6  2     
7  2     
8       
9  1     
10  2     
11  6     
12  5     
13  6     
14  4     
15  4     
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Table 46  
Bids Made in 15-minute Time Intervals - Participant 6 (10-bidder) 
Bid Periods 
Time 
(mins) 
17:40- 
17:55 
18:00- 
18:15 
18:20- 
18:35 
18:40- 
18:55 
19:00- 
19:15 
19:20- 
19:35 
1      1 
2  2     
3  4 3  3  
4    2  1 
5   2    
6   2 1 1  
7   1    
8  2 2 2   
9  1 3    
10  2 3    
11 1 1 1 1   
12 1 1     
13  2  1 1  
14 1 2 3 2 3  
15  2 2 3 3  
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Table 47  
Bids Made in 15-minute Time Intervals - Participant 7 (10-bidder) 
Bid Periods 
Time 
(mins) 
17:40- 
17:55 
18:00- 
18:15 
18:20- 
18:35 
18:40- 
18:55 
19:00- 
19:15 
19:20- 
19:35 
1  2     
2  1     
3     1  
4     1  
5       
6  1     
7  1     
8       
9    1   
10       
11       
12  1     
13 1  1    
14       
15   1 2 2 1 
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Table 48  
Bids Made in 15-minute Time Intervals - Participant 8 (10-bidder) 
Bid Periods 
Time 
(mins) 
17:40- 
17:55 
18:00- 
18:15 
18:20- 
18:35 
18:40- 
18:55 
19:00- 
19:15 
19:20- 
19:35 
1   1    
2   2    
3  1 2    
4  2     
5  1     
6    2   
7    2 1  
8  3     
9  3     
10  2    1 
11  1 2 2  1 
12  3 1 3  1 
13  3 2 2 3  
14 1 5 1 1 1  
15 2 6 2 4 2 2 
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Table 49  
Bids Made in 15-minute Time Intervals - Participant 9 (10-bidder) 
Bid Periods 
Time 
(mins) 
17:40- 
17:55 
18:00- 
18:15 
18:20- 
18:35 
18:40- 
18:55 
19:00- 
19:15 
19:20- 
19:35 
1    1 1  
2    1 2  
3  3 3  2  
4    1  1 
5  4 1    
6  1 3 2   
7  1 3 2   
8  1 3 2   
9 2 1 3    
10 1 1     
11 1 6     
12       
13 1 2   4  
14  4   6 4 
15 1 2 5 5 10 6 
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Table 50  
Bids Made in 15-minute Time Intervals - Participant 10 (10-bidder) 
Bid Periods 
Time 
(mins) 
17:40-
17:55 
18:00- 
18:15 
18:20- 
18:35 
18:40- 
18:55 
19:00- 
19:15 
19:20- 
19:35 
1       
2       
3       
4       
5       
6       
7       
8       
9       
10       
11       
12       
13     1  
14 2   2  1 
15 3 2 3 1 3 3 
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Table 51  
Bids Made in 15-minute Time Intervals – All Participants (10-bidder) 
Bid Periods 
Time 
(mins) 
17:40- 
17:55 
18:00- 
18:15 
18:20- 
18:35 
18:40- 
18:55 
19:00- 
19:15 
19:20- 
19:35 
1 0 3 2 2 1 1 
2 0 12 9 2 2 0 
3 0 13 16 4 6 0 
4 0 11 6 4 3 2 
5 0 9 7 9 0 3 
6 0 10 9 13 2 1 
7 0 10 9 9 1 0 
8 0 10 12 4 0 0 
9 3 10 10 1 0 0 
10 2 12 8 1 0 1 
11 4 19 3 6 0 1 
12 2 14 2 8 3 5 
13 2 15 5 12 14 7 
14 5 28 6 10 16 11 
15 7 28 15 21 29 22 
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Figure 45 through to Figure 48 show the bidding data of the participant 1-3 
individually and all participants together in the 3-bidder game. Participant 3 performed 
best in the game, and from the data it proves that the last minute bidding strategy is a 
way to success. 
 
 
Figure 45. Participant 1: Bid Distribution per Minute (3-bidder) 
 
 
Figure 46. Participant 2: Bid Distribution per Minute (3-bidder) 
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Figure 47. Participant 3: Bid Distribution per Minute (3-bidder) 
 
 
Figure 48. All Participants: Bid Distribution per Minute (3-bidder) 
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Figure 49 through Figure 53 shows the bidding data of the participant 1-4 
individually and all participants together in the 4-bidder game. From the figure, all the 
participants use the last minute strategy. Participant 1 ranks first among all the bidders. 
And he bids the most jobs. 
 
 
Figure 49. Participant 1: Bid Distribution per Minute (4-bidder) 
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Figure 50. Participant 2: Bid Distribution per Minute (4-bidder) 
 
 
Figure 51. Participant 3: Bid Distribution per Minute (4-bidder) 
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Figure 52. Participant 4: Bid Distribution per Minute (4-bidder) 
 
 
Figure 53. All Participants: Bid Distribution per Minute (4-bidder) 
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Figure 54- 65 shows the bidding data of the participant 1-10 individually and all 
participants together in the 10-bidder game. From the figure, most participants use the 
last minute strategy, except the best performer – participant 1. 
 
 
Figure 54. Participant 1: Bid Distribution per Minute (10-bidder) 
 
 
Figure 55. Participant 2: Bid Distribution per Minute (10-bidder) 
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Figure 56. Participant 3: Bid Distribution per Minute (10-bidder) 
 
 
Figure 57. Participant 4: Bid Distribution per Minute (10-bidder) 
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Figure 58. Participant 5: Bid Distribution per Minute (10-bidder) 
 
 
Figure 59. Participant 6: Bid Distribution per Minute (10-bidder) 
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Figure 60. Participant 7: Bid Distribution per Minute (10-bidder) 
 
 
Figure 61. Participant 8: Bid Distribution per Minute (10-bidder) 
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Figure 62. Participant 9: Bid Distribution per Minute (10-bidder) 
 
 
Figure 63. Participant 10: Bid Distribution per Minute (10-bidder) 
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Figure 64. All Participants: Bid Distribution per Minute (10-bidder) 
 
Tables 52 through 44 show the highest, lowest and average bids of each minute in 
all three games. Figure 66 – 68 shows the highest, lowest and average number of bids in 
each minute in a stock plot. 
 
Table 52  
Highest, Lowest and Average Number of Bids in Each Minute (3-bidder) 
Minutes 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
High 5 7 1 5 5 1 2 5 3 2 2 0 0 1 5 
Low 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Average 2.5 3.5 0.5 2.5 2.5 0.5 1 2.5 1.5 1 1 0 0 0.5 2.5 
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Figure 65. Highest, Lowest, and Average Number of Bids in Each Minute (3-
bidder) 
 
Table 53  
Highest, Lowest and Average Number of Bids in Each Minute (4-bidder) 
Minutes 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
High 4 5 5 4 3 1 2 2 1 0 0 1 0 0 9 
Low 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 
Average 2 2.5 3 2.5 1.5 0.5 1 1 0.5 0 0 0.5 0 0 6 
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Figure 66. Highest, Lowest, and Average Number of Bids in Each Minute (4-
bidder) 
 
Table 54  
Highest, Lowest and Average Number of Bids in Each Minute (10-bidder) 
Min 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
High 3 12 16 11 9 13 10 12 10 12 19 14 15 28 29 
Low 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 5 7 
Average 1.5 6 8 5.5 4.5 6.5 5 6 5 6 9.5 8 8.5 16.5 18 
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Figure 67. Highest, Lowest, and Average Number of Bids in Each Minute (10-
bidder) 
 
Figure 68 through to Figure 70 show the average bids per minute in the three 
games. Except for the 3-bidder game, the other two curves are pretty smooth. All the 
figures can be fitted by a sixth order polynomial. The regression co-efficient for the three 
sets of data is 0.57, 0.92 and 0.93, which means the fit is pretty good. 
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Figure 68. Histogram showing Average Bids per Minute (3-bidder) 
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Figure 69. Histogram showing Average Bids per Minute (4-bidder) 
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Figure 70. Histogram showing Average Bids per Minute (10-bidder) 
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Figures 71 – 74 shows the number of the bids submitted by the bidders to the jobs 
won by the bidders. The more bidders there are in the game, the weaker the relationship 
it seems to be. 
 
 
Figure 71. Histogram of Average Number of Bids to Jobs Won (3-bidder) 
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Figure 72. Histogram of Average Number of Bids to Jobs Won (4-bidder) 
 
 
Figure 73. Histogram of Average Number of Bids to Jobs Won (10-bidder) 
127 
 
 
  
Figure 74. Histogram of Profits to Jobs Won (3-bidder) 
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Figures 75 and Figure 76 show profits gained by bidders to the jobs won by the 
bidders. The more bidders there are in the game, the weaker the relationship it seems to 
be. 
 
 
Figure 75. Histogram of Profits to Jobs Won (4-bidder) 
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Figure 76. Histogram of Profits to Jobs Won (10-bidder) 
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSIONS  
 
Van Vleet first studied the Reverse Auction Bidding game at Texas A&M 
University in 2004. Previous research has shown an impact of the bidders’ personality 
types with the profit returns. It has been shown that usually the Guardian performs better 
than the other types of bidders. The Guardian and other types are defined according to 
the categories from the Keirsey Temperament Sorter Test. 
This current research, the sixteenth study in Reverse Auction Bidding at TAMU, 
was conducted to compare the difference in games played with different numbers of 
bidders, three four and ten participant games.  
A theory of four trend periods was developed by Chouhan (2009), as usual the 
four bidder game fits into the four defined trends. The three bidder game showed the 
probable existence of tacit collusion, generated by the perfect economic knowledge 
given in the games. The first or learning period is missing in the ten bidder game, as this 
is only the second time a ten bidder game has been studied there is insufficient 
information to determine if this is usual or an aberration. 
The 10-bidder game shows a long competitive period in the whole game which is 
good for the buyer to drive down the price. As the number of bidders increase, the 
competitiveness among the bidders increase which drives down the profits for each 
bidder. In this research, the best performer’s personality for each game is different from 
the usual Guardian.  
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The best performer’s personality for the three bidder game is Artisan; the best 
performer’s personality for the four bidder game is Guardian, as expected; and the best 
performer’s personality for the 10-bidder game is Rational, which requires further study. 
Even though the best performer’s personality may not all be Guardian, the type Guardian 
still ranks generally higher than the other types of personality.  
The results for the three games show that competition is important in the returns to 
the participants and the costs to the purchaser. The issue is however the likelihood that 
one will have ten participants in a real auction is considered low, the standard of four 
adopted for the long running study is considered more realistic.  
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APPENDIX A 
KIERSEY TEMPERAMENT SORTER TEST 
For each question, decide on answer a or b and put a check mark in the proper 
column of the answer sheet.  Scoring directions are provided.  There is no right or wrong 
answers since about half the population agrees with whatever answer you choose.   
1. When the phone rings do you 
a. hurry to get to it first 
b. hope someone will answer 
2. Are you more 
a. observant than introspective 
b. introspective than observant 
3. Is it worse to  
a. have your head in the clouds 
b. be in a rut 
4. With people are you usually more 
a. firm than gentle 
b. gentle than firm 
5. Are you more comfortable in making 
a. critical judgments 
b. value judgments 
6. Is clutter in the workplace something you 
a. take time to straighten up 
b. tolerate pretty well 
7. Is it your way to  
a. make up your mind quickly 
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b. pick and choose at some length 
8. Waiting in line, do you often 
a. chat with others 
b. stick to business 
9. Are you more 
a. sensible than ideational 
b. ideational than sensible 
10. Are you more interested in  
a. what is actual 
b. what is possible 
11. In making up your mind are you more likely  
a. to go by data 
b. to go by desires   
12. In sizing up others do you tend to be 
a. objective and impersonal 
b. friendly and personal 
13. Do you prefer contracts to be 
a. signed, sealed, and delivered 
b. settled on a handshake 
14. Are you more satisfied having 
a. a finished product 
b. work in progress 
15.   At a party, do you 
a. interact with many, even strangers 
b. interact with a few friends 
16.   Do you tend to be more 
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a. factual than speculative 
b. speculative than factual 
17. Do you like writers who 
a. say what they mean 
b. use metaphors and symbolism 
18. Which appeals to you more: 
a. consistency of thought 
b. harmonious relationships 
19. If you must disappoint someone are you  
a. usually frank and straightforward 
b. warm and considerate 
20. On the job do you want your activities 
a. scheduled 
b. unscheduled 
21. Do you more often prefer 
a. final, unalterable statements 
b. tentative, preliminary statements 
22. Does interacting with strangers 
a. energize you 
b. tax your reserves 
23. Facts 
a. speak for themselves 
b. illustrate principles 
24. Do you find visionaries and theorists 
a. somewhat annoying 
b. rather fascinating 
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25. In a heated discussion, do you 
a. stick to your guns 
b. look for common ground 
26. Is it better to be 
a. Just 
b. merciful 
27. At work, is it more natural for you to 
a. point out mistakes 
b. try to please others 
28. Are you more comfortable 
a. after a decision 
b. before a decision 
29. Do you tend to 
a. say right out what’s on your mind 
b. keep your ears open 
30. Common sense is 
a. usually reliable 
b. frequently questionable 
31. Children often do not 
a. make themselves useful enough 
b. exercise their fantasy enough 
32. When in charge of others do you tend to be 
a. firm and unbending 
b. forgiving and lenient 
33. Are you more often 
a. a cool-headed person 
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b. a warm-hearted person 
34. Are you prone to 
a. nailing things down 
b. exploring the possibilities 
35. In most situations are you more 
a. deliberate than spontaneous 
b. spontaneous than deliberate 
36. Do you think of yourself as 
a. an outgoing person 
b. a private person 
37. Are you more frequently 
a. a practical sort of person 
b. a fanciful sort of person 
38. Do you speak more in  
a. particulars than generalities 
b. generalities than particular 
39. Which is more of a compliment: 
a. “There’s a logical person” 
b. “There’s a sentimental person”  
40. Which rules you more 
a. your thoughts 
b. your feelings 
41. When finishing a job, do you like to 
a. tie up all the loose ends 
b. move on to something else 
42. Do you prefer to work 
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a. to deadlines 
b. just whenever 
43. Are you the kind of person who 
a. is rather talkative 
b. doesn’t miss much 
44. Are you inclined to take what is said 
a. more literally 
b. more figuratively 
45. Do you more often see 
a. what’s right in front of you 
b. what can only be imagined 
46. Is it worse to be 
a. softy 
b. hard-nosed 
47. In trying circumstances are you sometimes 
a. too unsympathetic 
b. too sympathetic 
48. Do you tend to choose 
a. rather carefully 
b. somewhat impulsively 
49. Are you inclined to be more 
a. hurried than leisurely 
b. leisurely than hurried 
50. At work do you tend to 
a. be sociable with your colleagues 
b. keep more to yourself 
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51. Are you more likely to trust 
a. your experiences 
b. your conceptions 
52. Are you more inclined to feel 
a. down to earth 
b. somewhat removed 
53. Do you think of yourself as a  
a. tough-minded person 
b. tender-hearted person 
54. Do you value in yourself more that you are 
a. reasonable 
b. devoted 
55. Do you usually want things 
a. settled and decided 
b. just penciled in 
56. Would you say you are more 
a. serious and determined 
b. easy going 
57. Do you consider yourself 
a. a good conversationalist 
b. a good listener 
58. Do you prize in yourself 
a. a strong hold on reality 
b. a vivid imagination 
59. Are you drawn more to 
a. fundamentals 
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b. overtones 
60. Which seems the greater fault 
a. to be too compassionate 
b. to be too dispassionate 
61. Are you swayed more by 
a. convincing evidence 
b. a touching appeal 
62. Do you feel better about 
a. coming to closure 
b. keeping your options open 
63. Is it preferable mostly to  
a. make sure things are arranged 
b. just let things happen naturally 
64. Are you inclined to be 
a. easy to approach 
b. somewhat reserved 
65. In stories do you prefer 
a. action and adventure 
b. fantasy and heroism 
66. Is it easier for you to 
a. put others to good use 
b. identify with others 
67. Which do you wish more for yourself 
a. strength of will 
b. strength of emotion 
68. Do you see yourself as basically 
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a. thick-skinned 
b. thin-skinned 
69. Do you tend to notice 
a. disorderliness 
b. opportunities for change 
70. Are you more 
a. routinized than whimsical 
b. whimsical than routinized 
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APPENDIX B 
KIERSEY TEMPERAMENT SORTER SCORING 
 Test Sample Sheet 
Enter a check for each answer in the column for a or b. 
 a b  a b  a b  a b  a b  a b  a b 
1   2   3   4   5   6   7   
8   9   10   11   12   13   14   
15   16   17   18   19   20   21   
22   23   24   25   26   27   28   
29   30   31   32   33   34   35   
36   37   38   39   40   41   42   
43   44   45   46   47   48   49   
55
 
  51   52   53   54   55   56   
57   58   59   60   61   62   63   
64   65   66   67   68   69   70   
 1   23 
    
  43    45    65    67    87   
         
 
 
3     4 
 
S N 
 
1     2 
 
E I 
 
5     6 
 
T F 
 
7     8 
 
J P 
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 Directions For Scoring 
1. Add down so that the total number of a answers is written in the box at the bottom 
of each column.  Do the same for the b answers you have checked.  Each of the 14 
boxes should have a number it. 
2. Transfer the number in box #1 of the answer grid to box #1 below the answer 
grid.  Do this for box # 2 as well.  Note, however, that you have two numbers for 
boxes 3 through 8.  Bring down the first number for each box beneath the second, as 
indicated by the arrows.  Now add all the pairs of numbers and enter the total in the 
boxes below the answer grid, so each box has only one number. 
3. Now you have four pairs of numbers.  Circle the letter below the larger numbers of 
each pair.  If the two numbers of any pair are equal, then circle neither, but put a 
large X below them and circle it. 
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